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'Wait a Minute. This Is Where I Came In."
A Trial Lawyer's Search for Alternative Dispute
Resolution
Steven H. Goldberg*
The first question about alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
is: "Alternative to what?"
As a latecomer to the ADR dialogue, I fist heard this question a t the initial session of the Hewlett Socio-Legal Institute on
Dispute Resolution, in the Spring of 1993. Twenty-five of
us-social psychologists, judges, social workers, business administrators, labor mediators, practicing lawyers, communications
teachers, law teachers, social scientists, graduate students, dispute resolution professionals, and myself, an about-to-be-ex-law
dean-were spending our first of thirty days together in an Ohio
State University Law School classroom. We were there t o discuss ADR with Deborah Hensler, Carol King, Craig McEwen,
Nancy Rogers, the late Maurice Rosenberg, Frank Sander, and
Gerald Williams, among others. Most of the Institute attendees
knew our leaders were among the giants in the field. One of us
had no clue he was about to view the landscape of the ADR
movement with some of the very best.
One of these giants, I do not remember who, began the opening session with "the first question about ADR," no doubt as a
teaching device more than an inquiry for which the answer was
truly in doubt. I was the only person in the room who knew almost nothing about ADR, but even I knew the answer. So did
everyone else. Of course, all of our answers were somewhat different, reflecting our different experiences, professional backgrounds, socio-political philosophies, and aspirations. Except for
me, the Institute participants had one important thing in common, each considered herself or himself a card-carrying member
of the ADR movement.'

* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
1. The author has spent about equal t i m e a decadeas a trial lawyer, a dean,
and a full-time law teacher. Though occasionally active as an arbitrator and intensely
interested in making litigation less painN for clients and lawyers, the author cannot
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Four years after that June morning in Columbus, following
some ADR practice and reading: I, too, teach an ADR course and
I, too, use "the first question about ADR" as the pathway into
the subject. But after :Four years of searching, I have a different
answer to that first question than the answer I knew, when I
knew nothing about the subject.
My original answer to the question "Alternative to what?"
was "the adversary system." ADR held out the promise of a
better way than the adversary system for handling at least some
of the inevitable friction in society. I could not define "better"
precisely, but it contained notions of faster, cheaper, less contentious, less aggravating, or more likely to leave the parties talking to each other when the process was over.
My current answer to the question "Alternative to what?" is
that ADR is not an alternative. Alternative Dispute Resolution
courses have become Dispute Resolution. In this society, dispute
resolution is the adversary system. My unhappiness with the
current answer is the reason for this essay and for its suggestion
that the ADR movement, and particularly the law teachers
within it, think again about the direction it should take.
In the classic sense of the outsider looking in, the ADR
movement has made it to "in7' status. During this decade, its
various forms have become commonplace in many American
courthouses. The movement is snowballing, as the number of
forms and the number of courthouses grows every year. A decade
ago, only a few law schools offered a course in ADR. Today, dispute resolution has become a staple elective in most schools (just

claim to be part of the ADR movement. The search for ADR reported here, with its
unfortunate conclusion, is the search of a trial lawyer.
2. There is much to read for one who jumps into the subject of ADR without
previous background. I have listed the material that I found most helpful and most
thought provoking in a bibliography a t the end of the essay. Many of the ideas in this
essay come from these readings or from conversations with the authors.
I dislike having my reading interrupted by a footnote, only to find that the
reference is to an idea not important enough for the text,but too dear to the author
to exclude. At other times, I break the train of thought, only to be told in the footnote
that five other people have a t one time or another said the same thing that the author
has said in text, as if the earlier observations made it true when the author's assertion
would not. Except for the first two footnotes, this essay contains no textual footnotes
and no attribution citations for propositions that have been previously stated by others.
Names of authors and articles that are worth mentioning are mentioned in text.
Footnotes appear solely to provide a citation for the reader who wishes to locate the
original document or attributed idea referred to in the text.
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as tax, corporations, and other popular electives). Course books
expand as the courts develop more of what Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow has called "The Law of ADR."3 Can a Restatement of the Law of ADR be far behind?
I liked it better when ADR was not fast becoming part and
parcel of society's main dispute resolution apparatus. The most
important word in "ADR movement" was "alternative." It was
the soul of the idea, its substance. Today, the form is succeeding,
but the substance is dying. More precisely, the substance is dying because the form is succeeding. The alternative in ADR has
become a victim of its own success.
Of course, many in the ADR movement will disagree. They
will contend that Professor Frank Sander's innovative vision of a
multi-door courthouse,4 has become reality, in one form or another, and that ADR is having a profound influence on dispute
resolution in America. A s in all things, where one stands depends largely upon where one sits.
For a decade a t the end of the 1960s and through most of the
1970s, I sat a t counsel tables in courtrooms, trying everything
from antitrust to zoning, with the most common stops a t contracts, criminal, estates, family, and tort. The legal community
was relatively small in our county seat in Minnesota and the
number of trial lawyers was even smaller. We had a civil pretrial
system that was more disclosure than discovery, and a criminal
trial system that was a mixture of "ambush trial" and wrangling
over the new "rights" the Warren Court had discovered, while
turning over the rocks in the garden of the Bill of Rights. Civil
disputes were settled without much falderal when they could be,
and tried quickly when they could not. Clients were as satisfied
as possible, given a system in which one side loses. Members of
the community a t large gave little thought to their justice system, when not personally involved, and maintained a grudging
respect for lawyers. Lawyer jokes were outnumbered by Polish
3. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale
of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA.ST. U.L. REV. 1 (1991).
4. For a description of how the "multi-door courthouse" might work see infm pp.
13-14.See generally Rank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111
(1976). Although Sander does not use the term "multi-door courthouse" this is a term
used by others to describe his ideas. See, e.g., Gladys Kessler & Linda J. Finkelstein,
The Evolution of a Multi-door Courthouse, 37 CATH.U . L.REV. 577 (1988);J e f i e y W.
Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait
Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fle&ling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DLSP.RESOL. 297,
324 (1996).
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jokes, in our largely Polish community. Trying cases was fun and
most of the trial lawyers were friends, there being no one else
willing to listen to trial stories for more than a drink or two. The
last thing any lawyer in our community was 'searchingfor was an
alternative to the relatively efficient, relatively just, relatively
enjoyable, and relatively profitable dispute resolution system
that we served and, paradoxically, over which we were the masters.
Toward the end of the 1970s, I found myself more often sitting in a chair in the conference room of a large Minneapolis lawfirm, or in court chambers, wrangling about what was and what
was not discoverable in a civil action. Trials were rarer. Depositions, motions, and fighting over procedures were more common.
Early settlements were harder to come by. Cases took longer to
come to trial. Lawyers were less pleasant. Clients were less satisfied. And Chief Justice Warren Burger, a one-time lawyer from
across the river in St. Paul, was complaining about the diminution of the quality of lawyering in America and the litigation
mess in the justice ~ y s t e m . ~
The Chief Justice was probably more concerned about criminal defense lawyers bombarding the federal courts (his, in particular) with rights claims for criminal defendants and prisoners
than he was for the quality of the examination and argument
skills in state trial courts. And he may have cared more about
the "unimportant" personal injury diversity suits taking federal
court time away from "important" corporate litigation than he
did about reforming the process of dispute resolution. His pronouncements on both lawyering and law reform, nevertheless,
carried the weight of his office and the breadth of its influence.
The 1976 Pound Conference in St. Paul, Minnesota6is often cited
as a watershed in the legal history of the twentieth century, the
time when the legal establishment embraced ADR and, in particular, Professor Sander's multi-door courth~use.~
There is a difference between marking a date and identifying
causes of change. It is the embrace of ADR with which I am here
5 . See Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized
Training and Ce&-fiation ole Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42
FORDHAM
L. REV.227 (1973).
6. Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future. Proceedings of the
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice. (A.L. Levin & R.R. Wheeler, eds., 1979).
7 . See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 4.
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concerned. The Pound Conference may have had a coincident
existence with the growth of the ADR movement, but other
forces were changing the legal landscape.
By the early 1980s, I was sitting in the ivory tower of academia watching the justice system on its way to free-fall. The legal
profession's ability to acculturate and finish the training of law
school graduates through guided experience had been completely
swamped by the rapidly multiplying number of graduates. The
exponential increase in unmonitored pretrial activity in civil
cases and the accompanying shenanigans (an urban practice
phenomenon-mostly in New York-for more than a decade
earlier) were spreading across the breadth of the legal profession
from North Dakota to Mississippi. In addition, the huge increase
in the number of lawyers, the insurance industry's insistence
that there was a litigation explosion, and television's often critical spotlight on the real and fiction of law practice were providing fuel for the smoldering coals of public disdain for lawyers.
I sat where most lawyers sat. The "impending crisis" in the
justice system was the grist for classes in professional responsibility and bar association conferences, for occasional hand wringing, and for suggestions to make litigation more efficient and
lawyers more civil. Although Professor Laura Nader, a one-time
supporter and insightful anthropological observer of the ADR
movement, claims that lawyers fueled the ADR explosion in the
years following the Pound Conference: ADR was not part of the
"impending crisis" dialogue for most of the nation's practicing
lawyers. There were, to be sure, a few pioneers and innovators in
academia, and even fewer in practice, who saw alternative methods of dispute resolution as an important answer to the growing
discontent about lawyers and justice. But those innovators were
a tiny minority among lawyers. In the late 1970s and the early
1980s, most lawyers were not searching for ADR.
The social phenomenon known as "the ADR movement"
started mostly outside of the law. The lawyers thinking about
ADR were an even more insignificant minority in the ADR movement than in the legal profession. The modern ADR movement
started in the late 1960s and 1970s, with neighborhood centers,
marriage counselors, conflict resolution types (social scientists,
8. See Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Pmctice of law: Hierarchy and
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIOST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL.1, 3, 6-7(1993).
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for want of a better term), and a host of other nonlawyers and
nonlawyer groups actively seeking kinder processes, empowerment of disputants, and better, longer-lasting relationships between disputants. A pervasive system of mediation and arbitration for resolving labor disputes and the American Arbitration
Association (both with heavy involvement from lawyers) were
well established by the 1960s, but they were not part of what
Professor Nader identifies as the modern ADR movement's "harmony ide~logy."~
The ADR moveme~it-at least the part that was concerned
with making fundamental changes in the way society resolved
disputes-enjoyed mociest success in the late 1970s and early
1980s as various groups and communities increasingly tried mediation as a way for solving problems-mostly small problems.
But the ADR movement made little progress in changing the
dispute resolution culture of the country. There were, to be sure,
ADR systems in a number of commercial communities (like the
diamond industry), but most of these were historical and unrelated to any push from the modern ADR movement. A significant
exception was the Center for Public Resources, an organization
to support ADR, founded by major corporate counsel seeking a
way to reduce the cost of resolving major business disputes.
As Professor Nader suggests, the ADR movement did not
begin to have any widespread influence in society until many of
the movers and shakers in the legal community began to see
ADR as a solution to the "crisis" in the justice system.1°
That is the time where I came in-along with a lot of other
lawyers. Toward the end of the 1980s the "impending crisis" in
the justice system had matured into a "full-blown crisis." From
my seat in the law school teaching trial advocacy, and from an
occasional perch in the world of practice, I joined the growing
group of academics and practitioners who were asking aloud
whether the current operation of the adversary system of justice
was sufficient for society's needs. Litigation appeared so costly,
so interminable, so freighted with procedural wrangling, coreugly, and inaccessible for most of the disagreements that most of
society wanted to resolve, that it seemed beyond salvage. Tinkering with the system might not make enough difference to be
worth the effort. More law schools were developing courses in
9. See id.
10. See id.
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ADR. Private dispute resolution enterprises were beginning to
spring up in areas of heavy population. Judges were beginning to
wonder whether some of these "other" dispute resolution ideas
might be saviors for their dockets, rather than threats to their
dispute resolution monopoly.
By the time of the 1993 Hewlett Institute, I had become a
full-fledged skeptic about the usefulness of the adversary system-at least for most civil disputes. It may have been due to
the four years spent as Dean of the Pace University Law School,
away from the day-to-day teaching and practice of law. It may
have been moving to New York, where everything that had
seemed troublesome in Minnesota's version of urban America
seemed disastrous in New York's seemingly rotten apple. The
more removed I had become from participation in the system,
the clearer it had become that the encrustations that pretrial
wrangling had placed on trial decision making were killing it-at
least killing the adversary system that had seemed so useful in
my trial practice of the 1970s. In any event, I could not resist the
allure of ADR and the chance to teach and write about something that might be useful to a society increasingly estranged
from an overly complex dispute resolution system.
I flew to Columbus with the same anticipation that most
judges and some lawyers had as they flew ADR in hopes of salvation. Somewhere in the wisdom of the ADR movement I would
find the key to making litigation less costly, aggravating, and
time-consuming, and more accessible, streamlined, and responsive to the needs of most citizens who had disagreements to be
resolved. And if it cleaned up the congestion in the courts a t the
same time, that would be okay, too.
I entered the classroom that first day having served as an
arbitrator in a number of matters, knowing something about
(though never having participated in) mediation, and having
heard something about minitrials, but knowing nothing beyond
the name. I was ready to be taught by the law professors, lawyers, and judges who had thought about how ADR could help fix
the adversary system.
The first shock was the class. I expected to find a room full of
practicing lawyers and law professors who were experienced in
ADR and meeting to share their experiences, wisdom, and ideas
for the future. There were a couple of practicing lawyers and law
professors in the room but they were badly outnumbered by the
social scientists and others of various nonlaw descriptions. What
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was someone from interpersonal communications going to offer
about streamlining the expensive and interminable wrestling
before trial? Was a psychologist really going to know anything
important about deciding cases--or finding some way other than
trial to make law?
The second shock was finding that I was not starting from
zero; I was somewhe~rein the hole. I not only knew very little
about ADR, the little I knew about arbitration was the least
important part of ADlR with which the Institute would be concerned.
The third shock was finding that most of the participants and
teachers in the Institute thought that the common-law trial (the
only part of the system that I thought was still working) was the
dispute resolution mechanism for which an alternative was most
needed.
Over the month of the Institute, I learned that different individuals had varying reasons for preferring ADR to the commonlaw trial. Although it was not then apparent, my colleagues'
reasons for preferring alternatives t o trials were subject to categorizations that reveal much about the ADR movement. As I
look back on it now, the participants and teachers in the Hewlett
Institute were fairly representative of the entire ADR movement. Their reactions and comments, though not a perfect reflection of the entire AD:R movement, are close enough so that the
Institute serves as a pretty good surrogate.
At the risk of oversimplification, the Institute participants
fell into two groups: those who sought an alternative to commonlaw trials because tiials were too inefficient, and those who
sought an alternative because common-law trials were too hard
on disputants, lawyers, and society in general. The groups were
neither self-conscious nor self-identifying. The articulation of
positions on various ADR issues was never aimed at demonstrating the dichotomy, even though some of the readings invited the
discussion. At the time of the Institute, I had neither the experience with nor the knowledge of ADR to notice what is now apparent to me. But the two groups are identifiable and important
for the observations ,and suggestions that follow in the second
and third parts of this essay.
It is tempting to suggest that the two parts of the ADR movement represent the ideological split Professor Robert Baruch
Bush claims is central to the adjudication/mediation controversy:
the "liberallindividualist"vision of society versus the "communi-
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tarianlrelationist" vision.ll While there is certainly an element of
that division separating the two groups, there is both more and
less to it than that.
The liberahdividualist was not represented in full flower at
the Institute. There were no outright opponents of ADR in attendance, though Professor Fiss's important critique of ADR,
Against Settlement,12was one of the first readings. There were
some rights-based advocates, but as to the adjudication system,
they were of the no-reason-to-do-away-with-it-completelykind,
rather than the it's-the-natural-order-of-things-and-should-beleft-untouched variety. Moreover, the topics of the Institute, save
for the introduction, did not lend themselves to debating the
efficacy of ADR. The Institute mainly attracted people who were
already part of the ADR choir. The communitarian/relationist,
therefore, was more in evidence, though one had to listen between the lines and understand the history and makeup of the
ADR movement to hear the importance of the ideology to some of
the positions taken. Being the only one in the room who was
neither a member of the choir nor knowledgeable about ADR, I
was hard of hearing. I make the observations in this essay
mostly from the echo.
Law training was an important, though not universal, difference between the two groups in the Institute. Including the author, there were two ex-tial lawyers, one judge, and no practicing trial lawyers in the group. Those with law training were
mostly law teachers or lawyers "practicing" ADR.
"Trial" was almost the universal answer to the "Alternative
t o what?" question, but the meaning of "trial" and the rationale
for finding an alternative were different between the two groups.
Most of the nonlawyers in the group disliked the trial for its
method. Most of the lawyers claimed to be at least neutral about
trials, but were concerned about their cost in time, money, and
court resources. Those nonlawyers who thought trials ought to
be replaced by better methods also made the antitrial arguments
of the lawyers about cost to clients, time for resolution, and
wasted societal resources. Those lawyers who thought that trials
were too expensive, time-consuming, and wasteful of the government's resources also made the antitrial arguments of the
11. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution
and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. CONTEMP.LEGALISSUES 1, 15 (1989).
12. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALEL.J. 1073 (1984).
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nonlawyers about finding methods for resolving disputes that
were kinder and gent1e:r on all involved in the process.
It is now clear that when the nonlawyers said "trial," they
used it as shorthand for adversarial dispute resolution. When
the lawyers said "trial," they meant trial. These different perspectives on the same answer to the "Alternative to what?'question reflect an important division in the ADR movement, one
with its roots in the movement's diverse origins. There are those
in the ADR movement who think the adversary system of dispute resolution is little more than a pagan right that ought to be
excised root and branch. There are those who think that engrafting the ADR forms and some of the underlying philosophy onto
the adversary system will fix it. The excisers (mostly
nonlawyers) would replace all adjudication with mediation, if
they could. The engrafters (mostly lawyers) would put negotiation, early neutral evaluation, mediation, minitrial, summary
trial, and arbitration into every courthouse. While I do not mean
to suggest that the ex~iserslengraftersdivision defines actively
opposing groups in the ADR movement, I do suggest that the
ADR movement combines two groups that arrive at the movement with different approaches and training. Recognizing that
difference is helpful in gaining an understanding of the current
and future states of ADR, much in the same way that Professor
Baruch Bush's liberallindividuajlists versus communitarianlrelationists dichotomy is useful in understanding the heat
in the mediation versus adjudication debate.
The Hewlett Institute consideration of ADR forms began
with negotiation. The discussion leader suggested that if one was
looking for an alternative to the pervasive method of dispute
resolution in society, it was negotiation, not trial, that was to be
replaced because negotiation, not trial, resolves most disputes.
As a trial lawyer, I had always thought of negotiation as part of
the trial process. The distinction between negotiation and trial
was therefore lost on me-until I heard the nonlawyers begin to
discuss negotiation.
The nonlawyers did not share my view that negotiation was
part of the trial process-a reality that Professor Marc Galanter
has identified and labeled "litigotiati~n."~~
They discussed negoti13. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle? Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1342 n.14 (1994) (citing and
explaining Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal
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ation as if it were a process that could be divorced entirely from
the adversary system and, more importantly, from
adversarialism. For them, negotiation was the basic process that
could convert the primary flaw of adjudication-the inevitability
of zero-sum resolutions (someone wins, someone loses), into the
panacea of problem solving-the potential for win-win resolutions (everyone smiles). The lawyers in the group, particularly
the negotiation teachers, shared the same ideas about effective
negotiation technique and used the same language to explain
negotiation styles as the nonlawyers, but their discussion of the
subject did not carry the same overtone of panacea.
Professor Gerald Williams' path-breaking study on lawyerlnegotiator types14 and his class material, with its echoes of
Jungian psychology,15set the tone for our consideration of negotiation. The nonlawyers heard it as an a h a t i o n of their view
that negotiation could be a problem-solving alternative to trial
resolutions, if only lawyers would learn to negotiate in the
proper spirit. The lawyers heard it as a description of different
techniques that might work well to provide an advantage in negotiation (an adversarial process by nature) even if the negotiation was in pursuit of a commercial transaction having nothing
to do with a trial.
Had I the background to listen properly, I would have been
able to infer, from the nonlawyers' view of negotiation, that
when they spoke of trial as the process for which an alternative
was important, they really meant the adversary system. I would
have understood that the gulf between the nonlawyers and the
lawyers in the ADR movement had great potential for growth.
Our mediation discussion provided a simple example. The
lawyers saw mediation as a tool for prodding a stalled negotiation into a settlement that would avoid trial. Anything the neutral mediator could do to achieve a settlement (short of deciding
for the parties-and maybe even that) was appropriate, because
achieving settlement was the standard for success. To borrow
two-thirds of Pr'ofessor James Alfini's elegant trilogy,16 the
heavy-handed "trashing" of the disputants' legal positions or the
Process, 34 J. LEGALEDUC.268 (1984)).
R.WILLIAhiS, LEGALNEGOTIATION
AND S E ~ L E ~ I E
15-46
N T (1983).
14. See GERALD
15. For a full exposition of Pmfessor Williams' approach, see Gerald R. Williams,
Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL.1.
16. See James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing it Out: Is This the End
of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA.ST. U.L. REV. 47 (1991).
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"bashing" of their dollar positions, until they met in the middle
was fine, so long as it worked.
The nonlawyers saw mediation as the paradigmatic alternative to the trial. "Haslling" (Alfini's third mediator style) in a
consensual mediation, so that the mediator's orchestration would
facilitate empowerment and create the transformative process,
was the only acceptable method of mediation for the nonlawyers.
Without consent, empowerment, and transformation, there was
little value in a mediated settlement.
The significance of the difference in approach between the
nonlawyers and lawyers was not as apparent to me as it should
have been, because the lawyerlmediator debate raged at the
same time. The suggestion that only lawyers should be allowed
t o mediate was the first issue in the Institute to divide explicitly
along 1awyerlnonlawye:r lines. The idea that only lawyers could
be effective mediators drove the nonlawyers apoplectic. I heard
their outrage as a turf issue and missed the real message. The
nonlawyers not only rejected the notion that mediators should be
required to be lawyers, they thought lawyers should not mediate.
It had nothing (at least not much) to do with non lawyers wanting the work. They believed that most lawyers were incapable of
shedding their adversary system indoctrination and perspective.
Ergo, lawyers would make poor mediators.
The last item on the Institute agenda-court-annexed ADRshould have made the division I have suggested between excisers
and engrafters obvious even to one as unsophisticated about
ADR as I was. If the nonlawyers were really, but unknowingly,
looking for an alternative to the adversary system, not just trials, what better subject than court annexed ADR to bring that to
their consciousness and into the discussion? It did not happen
and there is an important lesson for the ADR movement in that
failure.
Everyone wants ADR to "succeed," even if for different reasons. Professor Frank Sander, the architect of the multi-door
courthouse, led the Institute discussion of court-annexed ADR.
Some cautions were expressed about infringing on the right to
jury trial, forcing litigants to an extra procedural stop before
trial, and the theoretical inconsistency of mandating a process
based on consensual p,&icipation. Despite the cautions, each of
the Institute participants (including the leaders) seemed to think
annexation of ADR by the courts was a most important step in
achieving the goals of the ADR movement. The lawyers saw
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court annexation of ADR as a way to relieve the pressure on the
justice system, so it could operate better for all concerned. The
nonlawyers saw court annexation of ADR as a foot in the door, a
way to begin converting an inferior adversary system to a superior problem-solving method of resolving disputes.
Court annexation of ADR was the only subject during the
Institute about which I had a firm opinion. I was persuaded that
court annexation was a bad idea, but I was unable to persuasively articulate a reason to myself, let alone to anyone else.
I now know why court annexation of ADR is bad for the ADR
movement. If our litigation system becomes the sponsor, supporter, and "success" of ADR,ADR will lose its unique character,
and with it, its value to a society already too adversarial for its
own good. It is that idea and its consequences that take up the
remainder of this essay.

METTHE ENEMYANDTHEYAREUs!"17
'WE HAVE
ADR IN THELAND(THE MULTI-DOOR
COURTHOUSE)
OF LAWYERS
Those who believe that trial is the evil for which an alternative is needed should be exuberant. Legislators have discovered
ADR. They think it will save taxes. At the federal level, the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 199018 and the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act of 199019are but two examples. Courts have discovered ADR. They think it will clear dockets. State courts, as
well as federal, are jumping on the bandwagon. The growing
number of states with multi-door courthouses makes Professor
Jefiey Stempel's observation that "the practicalities of court
pressure, public preference, and political power ensure that ADR
in some form will be part of the judicial system for at least the
foreseeable future"20appears unassailable.
An alternative to "tial," unfortunately, was the last thing for
which this t i a l lawyer was searching. My experiences with trials
were positive. Even in complex cases with large amounts at
stake, trials were relatively quick, painless, and produced results that seemed as right as one might expect from any afterthe-fact exploration of "what happened."

17. Pogo, great swap philosopher and one-time staple of the comic pages of most
of America's newspapers.
18. 28 U.S.C. $5 471-82
19. 5 U.S.C. 5 574
20. Stempel, supra note 4, at 301.
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The further I became removed in time, geography, and population size from that satisfying experience as a trial lawyer, the
clearer it became that the road to those quick and painless trials
was increasingly long and torturous. Trial lawyers were all but
extinct by the late 1980s, except for those trying criminal cases
and a few personal injury lawyers. They had been replaced by a
group of people calling themselves litigators.
The civil pretrial swamp in which litigators work and
through which they &ragtheir clients might have been the Hell
of Dante's Divine Comedy, had he known about it. There are
scholarly apologia for the civil litigation system as the best dispute resolution system ever devised,2l but if you asked clients
you would find a different attitude. Most clients (and any litigator whom you could persuade to speak honestly about it) would
tell you that the pretrial process is so full of delays, battles over
secondary matters, and adversary attempts to avoid disclosing
information that it is hardly worth the candle.
I had become interested in ADlR as an alternative to that
system of civil dispute resolution that encouraged the parties or
their lawyers to engage in an unmonitored war of hide-and-seek
or harass-and-delay. :Learning that the justice system had discovered the "wisdom" of ADR and was annexing it to the already
overloaded and dysfunctional litigation system was not what I
wanted to hear. ADR adherents who are cheering court-annexed
ADR-because they b'elieveit will improve the justice system by
making it more like ADR-should take a lesson from the discovery "revolutionnof the late 1930s and 1940s.
The proponents of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the
current model for most pretrial schemes in the United States)
thought they were going to make the justice system better,
faster, and fairer.22In a sense, they were the first ADR proponents. They wanted to put an end to "trial by ambush." They
envisioned a future in which parties would become fully aware of
the facts through a kind of nonadversarial exchange of information before trial. They wanted resolutions based on all of the
relevant evidence. They believed fill disclosure would lead to
more settlements of an amicable and informed nature and fewer
trials of an adversarial and uninformed nature. And should trial

21. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 4.
22. For a balanced overview of the "intent"of the drafters, see Judith Resnick,
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U . CHI.L. REV.494 (1986).
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be inevitable, they did not want the result to be wrong because
one party could not produce evidence in the exclusive possession
of the other. They wanted a system that did not so heavily favor
the information holder, often the malefactor. They believed that
settlements, as well as trial results, would better mirror what
really happened than the results achieved by a system with almost no discovery. Although the drafters knew they were adding
rules of discovery to an adversary system, they thought the rules
were designed to facilitate a kind of "simple and effica~ious"~~
system of disclosure that would result in quicker settlements
and better trial results.
It did not work out that way. The shorter "ambush trial" has
been replaced by the longer pretrial war of attrition. The adversary system did more to change the nonadversarial disclosure
notion of the Rules of Civil Procedure than the Rules did to
change the adversary nature of the justice system. It is undoubtedly true that some parties have gathered facts about their claim
or defense under the discovery system that they might not have
learned in the prediscovery days. It is not so clear that the results of today's trials following discovery provide a better mirror
of the events in question than those ambush trials of
prediscovery days. The rectitude of trial results is one of those
things beyond either empirical or anecdotal proof. Whatever the
added benefit from discovery to individual parties or to adversary justice in general, it has come a t significant costs of time,
money, and aggravation not imagined by those who invented the
system. This is due, in large part, to a failure to understand that
lawyers would not treat pretrial activity as a time for open and
honest disclosure.
Litigators have treated pretrial as a time for adversary activity aimed a t gaining an information advantage, developing impeachment ammunition, limiting the opponent's trial options,
and harassing the opponent into a less-than-fair settlement. It is
common understanding (whether or not actually true) that lawyer pretrial behavior in the past quarter century has become
much more aggressive (often outrageous) than anything any trial
lawyer ever did in a courtroom-where the fact finder sees what
the lawyers are doing and judges the client's case in part on the
credibility and the conduct of the lawyer.
23. See Alexander HoltzoE, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 41 MICH.
L. REV.205, 224 (1942).
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When the litigation culture of using discovery to gain every
competitive advantage was developing in lawyers' conference
rooms, there were no practical checks on what lawyers could do.
It was laissez-faire adversary discovery without enforceable
rules. Outrageous conduct--everything from purposeful delay
and destruction of evidence to unbelievable harassment of witnesses and lawyers-became so common that the stories ceased
t o be surprising. The cvnendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure of the 1980s and 1990s mere aimed at encouraging
sanctions. Trial "referees" evolved, in Professor Judith Resnik's
apt description, into "managerial judges."24The amendments to
the Rules of Civil Procedure had limited success in reigning in
lawyer conduct. Some of them, most spectacularly Rule 11, have
succeeded only in spawning new places for new kinds of pretrial
wrangling. Professor Stephen Yeazell offers a most picturesque
description of the effect of the Rules in changing and the ineffectiveness of the "managerial judges" in controlling lawyer behavior: "control of litigatic~nhas moved further down the legal food
chain-from appellate to trial courts, and from trial courts to
lawyers."25The clients who suffer in the system, no doubt, see
the sharks pooling.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure effectively moved the
determinative part of the adversary contest from the light of the
courtroom to the dark of the lawyers' conference rooms, with the
unintended effect of making the adversariness of the system
longer, stronger, and more expensive, to boot. ADR will suffer
the same fate. The disclosure rules did not make the justice system more fair and less adversarial. The justice system became
less fair and more adversarial. ADR will not make the justice
system more like ADR. The justice system will make ADR more
like litigation. The changes are already apparent.
There are many forms of ADR (negotiation, early neutral
evaluation, arbitration, minitrials, and summary trials), but
mediation is the paradigm. Supporters of mediation have argued
that any settlement achieved in a consensual process is likely to
be "better" than one imposed by adjudication-better in fairness,
acceptance by the parties, and the civility of the process. Mediation promises the possibility of less formality, less concern for
24. See Judith Resnik, hlanagerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
25. Stephen C.Yeazell, I'he Misunderstmd Consequences of Modem Civil Process,
1994 Ws.L.REV. 631, 647.
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legal rights and process, and more attention to individual concerns and solutions-more attention to problem solving. It can
be done without lawyers. It can be done without publicity. It can
be done without weighing down the result with concern for how
subsequent disputes might be resolved.
Now the justice system has hold of ADR.
Consent, so central to the notion that the parties and society
will profit from solutions by agreement, has been replaced by
mandatory participation. Even in those court-annexed programs
where mediation is not mandatory, it has been my observation
that many judges trying to clear dockets coerce parties into mediation. Many ADR proponents, paradoxically, support the effort.
Some believe that mediation is so superior to adjudication that it
will take over the courthouse. Others believe it is so important
to society-and so unlikely to be used without coercion-that
consent should be ignored in order to save mediation as a viable
dispute resolution alternative. Professors McEwen & Milburn,
for example, offer the paradox that people "forced" to participate
in the consent-driven process of mediation, nevertheless, are
often pleased with and profit from the process.26
The notion that nonlawyers with different skills, perspectives, and substantive knowledge will bring a refreshing difference to mediation has been replaced by the notion that only lawyers can mediate. The concept of the mediator as facilitator,
someone who would empower the parties and pave the way for
an agreement that would prosper because of the parties' stake in
it has been replaced by the mediator as pseudo-decision maker.
The idea that something other than rights and legal process
might inform agreements has been replaced by the idea that
mediators will trash the parties legal positions or bash their
demands until the parties, exhausted, meet in the middle.
Putting mediation into the courthouse has made both mediation and the court processes more, not less, cumbersome. Even
parties with cases that ought to be adjudicated are forced into
the time, expense, and seeming irrelevancy of mediation.
Professor Stempel's suggestions for updating Professor
Sander's multi-door courthouse are exemplary of what happens
when you give lawyers control of a dispute resolution mecha-

26. See Craig A. McEwen & Thomas W . Milburn, Explaining a Paradox of
Mediation, 9 NEGOTIATION
J . 23 (1993).
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nism. When you put ADR into the courthouse, it begins to look
like litigation:
Sander's screening clerk, who would pick the right "door"
for the dispute would be "upgraded to a judicial officer
of substantial training and di~cretion."~~
The clerks who work for the new "upgraded judicial officer" should be "lawyers with training and background
substantially similar to that of United States Magistrate~."~~
After the "Intake Magistraten requires the parties to
participate in a process for deciding which door should
be used, and after the magistrate decides which door
is available, the parties have a "limited right of appeal to a judge assigned to preside over this aspect of
the court's ~aseload.'"~
If one ADR procedure does not work, the parties might be
required to participate in further ADR procedures
before being admitted to the sanctity of a triaL30
The no-discovery culture of traditional ADR would be
replaced b;y early discovery, not only to aid in the
ADR resolution, but also to determine which ADR
method should be used in the first in~tance.~'
Instead of using volunteers to do the ADR work, the mediators, arbitrators, e t ~ .should "receive sufficient
compensation and benefits so as to attract society's
most able
The entire ADR process should be subject to appellate
review.33
A party should not be involved in ADR without legal repre~entation?~

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Stempel, supra note 4, at 370.

Id.
Id. at 371-72.
See id.at 372.
See id.
Id. at 373.
See id. at 374-75.
See id. at 382.
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Mediators should be able to actively intervene and to
force parties into a different method of ADR or to
trial:=
The compelled ADR results would be admissible if the
matter eventually came to trial?"
Some or all of the above might be fine for an adversary system trying t o change the way it handles cases, but none of it is
good for developing alternatives to the litigation system. None of
it is good for ADR-a cheaper, fairer, less contentious, and simpler way to resolve some disputes.
The problem is lawyers. I do not mean to suggest that some
lawyers are not fine ADR practitioners, both representing people
and facilitating ADR procedures, but that does not mean one
should choose lawyers as the group to define ADR. And when
ADR goes into the judicial system, it will be defined by lawyers-more specifically, by the concerns that lawyers are trained
t o protect. The law and lawyers are concerned with who is right,
which procedures constitute due process, creating precedents
that defme normative behavior, and creating results that are
acceptable enough to society so that it will not opt for some less
acceptable method of resolving disputes, such as reliance on
might. Moreover, in our society, "justice" depends upon the assumption that "truthnwill be most readily discovered by an intellectual war between trained gladiators representing competing
ideas.
The discovery revolution again provides a useful warning for
ADR proponents who believe they will advance ADR and improve the justice system by putting the two together. It is impossible to prove that lawyers caused the trial system to deteriorate
into the litigation system, but it is ciear they were around when
it was happening.
The more cynical view might suggest that the litigation
change in lawyers and lawyering was coincident with the explosion in the number of lawyers, the exponential increase in large
law firms, and the religion of lawyers--charging for work by the
hour rather than the task. Conscious or not, the legal services

35. See id. at 379, 383.
36. See id.at 376.

Heinonline

--

1997 BYU L. Rev. 671 1997

672

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I997

industry had a stake in litigation that took longer, required more
people, and involved more intricacjr--even if the intricacy had
nothing to do with the merits of the dispute, but centered instead on how the game was being played. The more charitable
explanation is that lawyers are acculturated to believe that the
adversary common-law process is the best way to order society
and are trained in techniques to perpetuate and effectuate that
system.
In either event, when asked to mold something foreign into
an effective adjunct to their adversary system of justice, lawyers
will, invariably, mold it into a shape with which they are familiar. Professor Stempel's view provides an exquisite example:
Although the debate will undoubtedly rage about whether this
constitutes "real mediation" or justifies mandatory programs, it
seems inevitable that mediation officers must be willing to
depart from passive neutrality when warranted (just as a judge
does), and that mediation, like any form of disputing, probably
works better when lawyers (the world's leading dispute resolution specialists) are part of the proce~s.~'

It is not that lawyers are bad people. It is that we cannot
help it. Part of the reason that adjudication works so well-if we
finally get around to it-is that lawyers are well trained to look
at and describe the world in a particular way.
ADR proponents are not the only ones who ought to be wary
of court-annexed ADB. Lawyers ought to be equally leery of putting ADR methods into the justice system. It is a shame that in
pursuit of our goal of adjudicating truth, we lawyers have so
cluttered the system that it does not work as well as it might.
We will not gain much ground, however, by constructing still
more courthouse hurdles in front of the courtroom door. Our
unique system of truth through intellectual battle suffers from
too much process, not too little. If its supporters want to preserve a system that provides societal norms through judicial
precedents, they ought to wony less about incorporating ADR
and worry more about stripping the system of the pretrial adversarial clutter that bludgeons parties into settlements instead
of decisions. It is trial, not settlement, which validates the system. If the system does not vindicate rights, assign fault, and
create societal norms through trial results, it is not worth the
37. Id. a t 383 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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time and money society pours into it. That is not to say that all
cases ought to be tried. It is to say that the value of the system
is in the trial results, not the settlement results. Settlements
may be valuable, but not for establishing rights, fault, and societal norms. Moreover, settlements are more easily achieved in
other settings.

A judicial system dominated by the lawyer's perspective is
certain to care more for rights and process than is necessary to
resolve every societal disagreement.
Where should we deal with those disagreements that do not
need all the rights and process due in the justice system, with
those disagreements that might profit by other considerations?
An effective trial system for assigning fault, blame, or liability
might not reach the "proper" resolution for all disagreements.
Trial might not be worth the trouble for all disagreements, even
if it reaches the "proper" result. Individuals may not be as well
served by the "right" result as they would be by the "right" process. Trial might be a more expensive, lengthy, and public process than some might wish or prudence might dictate for the
resolution of their problems. The culture promoted by constant
resort to fault and rights determinations for all of society's differences might not be as useful as a culture promoted by communitarian values.
This is not to say that the adversary system is not an important tool for resolving disputes. Not even the
postmodernists-the most recent school of scholarly attack on
the adversary system-want to abandon it entirely. Professor
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, in her devastating critique of the adversary system, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, for example, allows that the
adversary system '%as its value."38
A decision about fault and liability is often critical to future
community peace, psychologically important to individuals, therapeutic for society at large, and a useful way to establish societal
norms. Many disputes cry out for adjudication and ought to be

38. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Postmodem, Multicultural World, 38 W M .& MARYL. REV.5, 40 (1996).
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subject to effective resolution in court. The problem is that there
are very few disputes that can be effectively adjudicated in our
society. There are too few trials to provide either vindication or
precedent. We have a brutal "on the way to trial" system that
results in settlement by accident, judicial coercion, surrender, or
exhaustion. We, lawyers of the 1980s A d 1990s, have proven
beyond disagreement that we are incapable of maintaining an
adjudication system in a manner worth the effort.
If we are to find a better way to resolve disputes in our society, the first thing we must do is fix the one door that every
courthouse must have-the door to the courtroom-rather than
to spend our time worrying over the design for a multi-door
courthouse. Nothing else will matter if we cannot fix the trial
door. The individual equality provided by our justice system's
trials is deep in our cultural psyche and central to our understanding of society. At one level, Professor Fiss is right, we cannot tolerate a world in which all disputes are resolved by settlement, a system of adversary ju~tice.3~
The more we settle, the
less we try. The more our justice system develops a settlement
mentality, the less vigor it will have for trying those cases that
ought to be tried. Putting ADR doors on the courthouse only
further increases the likelihood of settlement by exhaustion,
while it reduces the number of disputes passing through the trial
door.
This essay is not primarily concerned with all the details of
how to repair-maybe open is a better tern-that trial door, but
it is clear that more trials will occur only if there is less wrangling and decision making before tirial and greater expedition
and acceptability during trial. Professor Yeazell's telling observation that the percentage of federally filed civil cases resulting
in trials dropped by almost 80% in the half century since the
advent of the Rules of' Civil Procedure4"cannot be attributed to
coincidence.
Replacing discovery with disclosure would be a first step to
fixing the trial door. Without elaborating an entire statutory
scheme, one can imagine that a rule of full disclosure with criminal penalties of the kind we now assess for testimonial perjury
might be at least as effective for information exchange as the
current system of adversary discovery. Changing the rules of
39. See supra text accompanying note 9.
40. See Yeazell, supra note 25, at 633.
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evidence to conform more with the way we process information
for making other important decisions might both speed up and
tune up the trial process. Trying cases only before juries comprised of the first twelve people randomly selected from the community-no judges-might provide a system of decision making
that truly reflects the composite values of the society.
The above suggestions will draw howls of protest--detailing
the ripple effect of the unintended consequences of such nonsense-from those currently toiling in the adversary system.
These suggestions are not offered, however, as something to be
done in isolation tomorrow. They are offered to make the point
that there are many possibilities for reform of the trial system, if
one is first clear about what the trial system is designed to accomplish.
If an absolutely accurate reproduction of past events is the
object of trial, then there may be something to the howls. Adversary searching may turn up some information that disclosure
under the penalty of prison might not. The pejury laws do not
stop all witnesses from lying. The current rules of evidence
might keep out some unreliable information that a more permissive scheme might allow. Trained judges might be marginally
better at finding facts than twelve randomly selected citizens.
(The author does not happen to believe this, but has observed
that a majority of federal judges and many commentators do).
If, on the other hand, one appreciates the trial system as
principally a vehicle for establishing societal norms, an instrument for resolving disputes that will discourage brawling on the
street corner, and a participatory mechanism for imposing community values on dispute resolution, one might have a different
view of what changes in the trial system might be reasonable.
Fixing the trial door is important to the vindication of many
core societal values, but that does not mean that every dispute
should be handled in a trial system or that those core values
must be vindicated for every dispute of a particular kind or for
every particular kind of dispute. But try to persuade the public
of that. Despite the mess we have made of the judicial system
and the pain it inflicts on those clients with the temerity to try
it, "1'11 take it to court" remains the almost universal response to
disagreements in our society. It matters not how trivial the dispute or how unhelpful a trial resolution might be to the individual or to society at large.
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The school did not choose your overweight daughter to be a
cheerleader. "Take it to court."
Your neighbor's tipple tree sheds its apples into your yard.
"Take it to court."
Your car was part of one of this year's tens of thousands of
road accidents. "Take it to court."
You don't like the boss's jokes. "Take it to court."
You don't want your former wife to raise your son. "Take it to
court."
You don't want your neighbor to park his RV next to his garage. "Take it to court."
You don't want a halfway house in your neighborhood. "Take
it to court."
You don't want a n X-rated theater in your neighborhood.
"Take it to court."
You don't like the condition of something you purchased.
"Take it to court."
You did not receive all you hoped for from a product. "Take it
to court."
Something thought to be safe three decades ago turns out not
to be. "Take it to COW."
Legislatures, religions, minor scuffles, community pressures,
consensus, respected elders, and the force of cultural tradition
have all been diminished as means for solving some societal
problems by: "I'm right. I'm going to court."
Rejecting the multi-door courthouse as the forum for handling those disagreements that ought not to be in a trial system
does not mean rejecting the ADR movement and leaving everything to trial. Quite the contrary, rejecting the multi-door courthouse means giving life to the notion of alternative, to escape
from the adversary system of justice. The ADR movement had a
chance to help us change our obsession with the law, until it
joined the law and lclst its character--or its soul, if you are so
inclined. The multi-door courthouse does not provide alternative
dispute resolution; i t provides substitute dispute resolution.
ADR in the courthouse is just another way to finish the journey
through the swamp we call litigation.
We need alternative places and alternative methods for solving some of society's problems. We need to have something more
than a substitute forum in a litigation system to show for the
innovation and the effort that went into the modern ADR movement. We need to find, again, that passion for alternative.
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It is unsettling for this trial apologist to find himself-at the
end of the search for ADR-agreeing with the original goal of the
nonlawyer (anti-lawyer?) group in the ADR movement: establishment of some dispute resolution institutions outside of the adversary system. It is frustrating to realize that there is no alternative to litigation, because ADR has become a success by becoming part of the litigation system. It is downright perplexing
to find that the only people seriously pursuing dispute resolution
alternatives outside of the litigation system are the
postmodernists-people who have little regard for the adversary
trial.
The postmodern critique of adversary justice is unlike
postmodern critiques in architecture and literature, where the
label was first used. The seemingly nonsensical name (What is
newer than new?) usually identifies those who react against
modernism by self-conscious use of earlier styles or conventions.
Legal postmodernists have no particular interest in a dispute
resolution style or convention of the past--certainly not the preRules trial. Their focus of deconstruction is an "adversary system
[that] is inadequate, indeed dangerous, for satisfying a number
of important goals of any legal or dispute resolution system."41
It is jarring to a trial lawyer who thinks that adversary system jury trials are crucial to the fabric of our society, to discover
more shared goals with the postmodernists than with other trial
lawyers, ADR advocates, or dispute-resolution commentators.
Postmodernists reject the notion of adversary justice for
many reasons that are beyond the explicit purpose of this essay,
but they center their critique on the system's inability to find the
truth. For example, Professor Menkel-Meadow's critique of the
adversary system focuses on two propositions about truth: 1)
"[blinary, oppositional presentations of facts in dispute are not
the best way for us to learn the truth;" and 2) "polarized debate
distorts the truth, leaves out important information, simplifies
complexity, and obfuscates rather than clarifie~."~~
I am prepared to concede that trials are not perfect (maybe
not even very good) truth-finding devices, but so what? Truth
finding is not the primary purpose of the common-law trial. The
primary purpose is to resolve society's disputes through a process in which the disputants may be heard and through which
41. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3, at 6.
42. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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community values may be brought t o bear on the decision. We
indulge the myth that the adversary trial reaches the real truth
(as did the proponents of the joust and every other adversary
system) because it is required; it is part of our aspiration to immortality. But it remains a system for ordering the behavior of
less-than-perfect people, by resolving their differences through
the "informed" judgment of other less-than-perfect people, about
a less-than-perfect rep:resentation of less-than-perfect perspectives on past events. Its imperfections, in a sense, are its
strength. So long as truth is its aspiration, the imperfection of
the disputants, the participants, and the fact finders are no reason to discard it. The poet teaches, "Ah, but a man's reach should
exceed his grasp, / Or what's a heaven for?"43
My insistence on the value of the social utility of the adversary trial, irrespective of its inability to guarantee the "truth,"
aligns me, paradoxically, with the postmodernists who also find
important values other than truth that ought to be served by the
dispute resolution system. Professor Menkel-Meadow asks: "I
wonder what would result if we redefined our legal system to
seek 'problem-solving' a:s one of its goals rather than 'truth-findkg-' "44
What, indeed? I take her reference to "legal system" to mean
the full panoply of a society's dispute resolution system. And
while I would leave "1;ruth-finding" to a trial-centered justice
system (imperfect as tlrial results might be), it is time that we
reduce the size and the importance of that justice system, so
that different ways to avoid or handle disagreements might develop. It is one thing tot hold rights in high regard and to attach
importance to blameworthiness; it is something else to be obsessed with it, as we seem to be.
There are some changes in law and procedure that we could
make to reduce the influence of the litigation system in our society, but we are speakir~g,ultimately, about a change in culture.
A change in culture will come mostly from outside the justice
system and the people who operate it, not from within. Because
that is where I come out, it is discomforting to find ADR inside
the justice system. That is where I came in.
Deciding which disputes ought to be resolved outside of the
courts and deciding how to persuade those with the disagree43. ROBERTBROWNING,
&DREA DEL SARTO.
44. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3, at 30.
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ments t o go elsewhere are difficult-some would q g u e impossible-issues. While I have no more to offer than others about how
to solve those difficult problems, it is clear that no progress can
be made while those interested in alternatives focus on incremental changes in an adversarial litigation system.
Are there other doors available?
We do not often think of legislation as a dispute resolver, but
it can do in batch what the common-law does one dispute at a
time. If we had more systems like no-fault automobile insurance,
would we have a less just society? Does the case-by-case assessment of negligence really influence how others drive? Does it
redistribute wealth in a way that is more just than other, less
costly methods? Private arbitration has been successful, both in
homogenous communities, such as the diamond industry, and in
the broader context of the commercial world at large. There is no
reason to believe that private mediation would not become successful if the only mediation available existed outside of the
court system. For people with problems that are larger in personality than they are in dollars, mediation offers a more satisfying result. For companies that develop large monetary disputes,
but must deal with each other over time, mediation offers a response for both the money and the future. Other societies, and
ours in an earlier time, have left some problems to the exclusive
province of religion. A council of wise, usually, men, has been
used by other societies to regulate important societal behavior.
(The Senecas, a matrilineal society, used wise women as well,
and by all accounts, with equal success.45)Some societies-again,
ours, in its earlier days-have preferred a five-minute fistfight to
a year-long, hundred-thousand-dollar lawsuit that consumes the
time and attention of the disputants, fiends, families, employees, and, oh yes, their lawyers. (How much better would all have
been served if the CEOs of IBM and Fujitsu--or pick your own
decade-long corporate dust up--had been locked in a closet with
boxing gloves, rather than spending tens of millions of dollars
and years of attention on a dispute that ended up in a draw of
sorts-a result equally likely to occur in a fistfight between two
out-of-shape CEOs with pillows on their hands?)
While I do not mean to advocate a punch in the nose as a
dispute-resolution method of choice for a peaceful society, it
-

45. See ANTHONY F. C. WALLACE,
!CHE DEATH
AND REBIRTH
OF THE SENECA
28-29
(1970).
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must be clear that many societies have prospered without taking
every disagreement to a lawyer and then to the litigation machine. To be sure, this society grew and matured more rapidly
during a time when the days-of-litigation-per-personin the country were substantially fewer than they are today. In order to
reduce our reliance on litigation as the method for handling society's problems, we must create a world in which people recognize, at the outset, that there are doors other than the door to
the courthouse. Once the person with the problem starts into the
litigation system, the litigation ethic envelopes the problem, the
litigation practitioners work on the problem, and values other
than "rights" and "fault" have no chance.
People outside the justice system, such as those nonlawyers
attracted to ADR in the late 1960s and early 1970s, are critical
to the establishment of the multi-door world. It will not happen
without their innovation and their advocacy. We, lawyers who
share their interest in resolving some of society's disagreements
through problem solving, must recognize the importance of helping them to establish institutions that will compete with the
justice system, rather than bringing them into our intractable
world of advocacy.
The current pervasiveness of the legal solution in our society
makes it imperative that we work on lawyers as well. Like it or
not, lawyers will be the gatekeepers to dispute resolution in this
society for the foreseeable future. Although they should not be
expected to lead the way to resolving disputes outside of the
justice system, they mcy be educated to understand that a more
diverse dispute-resolution world will better serve their clients. It
is the welfare of the client, after all, by which we justify our existence.

This trial lawyer's search for ADR, which led back to the
courthouse from which he started, was fruitful despite finding no
there, there. As with most searches, it is the searching, not the
finding, that is of the most value.
We, lawyers who are privileged to teach and to shape tomorrow's lawyers, owe that search to our students. We need to reorient our approach. We should return to consideration of the lawyer's role as steward for society's dispute-resolution mechanisms
and as problem-solving counselor for clients. Many early ADR
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courses were more about the personal development of the dispute resolution professional and the nonlegal options for the
client than they were about the law, or even the technique, of
ADR. The texts, the teaching, and the perspectives are shifting.
Court annexation has made ADR a law-fhn profit center and a
law school "skills" subject. We teach negotiation and mediation
the way we teach Trial Advocacy. We focus on the "skills" that a
lawyer must learn in order to "win" a negotiation or mediation.
Even as we offer the win-win approach to negotiation, best captured in Fisher & Ury's standard, Getting to Yes,46we sell it to
our ADR students as a technique for maximizing results for their
clients, rather than as a different perspective on the solution of
problems. We even send our students to negotiation competitions. Can mediation competitions be far behind?
We owe it to our students to push their horizons beyond the
craft of lawyering. The ADR course ought to be a convenient
window to inquiry how we serve the society as stewards and our
clients as counselors. ADR is where we ought to examine the
limits to the usefulness of the adversary system, where we
should consider the consequences to our society of an overly legal
dispute-resolution culture. It is in ADR where our students
ought to ask whether rights and fault ought to be the cornerstones for handling all of society's problems, or whether lawyers
ought to have a broader perspective.
Jurisprudence and legal philosophy are virtually dead in
legal education-if student interest and course enrollments are
any measure. It is not pedagogically cool to deal in the abstract
when there is lawyering to be learned. ADR offers the opportunity to stretch our students' perspectives and inquiries beyond
the craft they will practice a year or two after sitting in our
classrooms. We can use this simulation course-the sure road to
student engagement and interest-to slip in, while no one is
looking, some concern for the lawyer's role in society. If we can
expand our students' horizons to understand the value to their
clients and to society of a world that can resolve some of its problems outside of an adversary model, we might help to develop a
world in which our students will continue to be considered useful.

46. ROGERFISHER& WILLIAMURY,G
1991).

~ TO YES
G (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed.
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